
SUDIPTA BHATTACHARYYA DEPT. OF ECONOMICS VIDYASAGAR UNIVERSITY S ince 1991, the policy of economic liberalization [New Economic Policy (NEP)] was introduced in Indian agriculture. The direct and immediate impact of this policy was to cut in food and fertiliser subsidies and therefore a rise in fertiliser price. The fertiliser price was increased by 40 per cent in August 1991 and subsequently the rise was reduced to 30 per cent. The reduction in food and fertiliser subsidies came as a direct consequence of the recommendation of the Fund/Bank as a main conditionality of structural adjustment programme to cut down the non-plan budgetary expenditure in order to reduce fiscal deficits. Since the fertilizer was used on more than 85 per cent of irrigated land and about 50 per cent of unirrigated land by 1988-89 [Rao and Gulati, 1994], such a unilateral withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies is bound to have a detrimental impact on the economy.In the agricultural credit front, NEP from its inception was in favour of the abolition of all concessional rates of interest. Narasimham Committee on financial sector reform2 recommended that the priority sector lending should be slashed down from 40 per cent to 10 per cent. Though the government has postponed action on this particular recommendation, but it has otherwise shown a positive response towards `progressive dis-involvement in rural credit for commercial bank [Krishnaswamy, 1994]by taking decision to close down all the loss making branches of the commercial bank located in rural areas. Thus, on agricultural credit front the NEP implies a policy of a credit squeeze in agriculture. However, we have so far described only the direct impact of the NEP. One should take into account the indirect impacts as well to assess the overall impact of the NEP. The relevant question here is whether the impact of NEP is confined to the impact on inflation, poverty and unemployment. It might be mentioned that the period between 1990-91 and 1994-95 is marked as the longest time period in the Indian economy when the inflation rate stuck to the double digit. This persistent inflation during the first half of the 1990s was accompanied by five good monsoons in a row and the absence of any exogenous shock from the outside. Now the question is that how does the NEP contributed to the process of inflation. First of all there is a cost push inflation with the withdrawal of a subsidy on fertilizer. Secondly an inflation engineered by the rise in the administered prices for petroleum products or other public utilities. Thirdly, the tariff reforms followed by a hike in export duties that has fuelled inflation and squeeze real incomes of the poor. Fourthly, the devaluation of the Indian rupee has raised the cost of the imported intermediate capital goods and has again fuelled inflation. Finally, some economists have the opinion that the money supply which grew 18 per cent per annum between 1991-92 and 1994-95 was not tight enough to reduce demand pull inflation, rather the high interest rate policy of the stabilization programme has contributed to cost push inflation [Nayyar,1996]. It is well known that the general price is determined dominantly by the food price in India which again is determined by the performance of the agricultural sector. It may be presumed therefore the rate of inflation would have been even higher in the absence of some good monsoons and the bumper harvest in 1992-1993. The withdrawal of the fertilizer subsidy led to the political pressure of the rich farmers lobby inside and outside the parliament and consequently led to an increase in the procurement price. Consequently, the procurement prices of common paddy and wheat were both raised by more than 50 per cent between 1990-91 and 1993-94. At the same time, the issue prices in the public distribution system were raised even more by 86 per cent for the common rice and by 72 per cent for wheat in the same time period [Nayyar, 1996]. The increase in the price of food grain is indeed accompanied by the stagnation and decline in the per capita availability of food grain. The public distribution system could not support the poor at the phase of decline in the per capita food availability as the difference between ration shop price and market prices narrowed to a small margin. The sales through the public distribution system as a result declined steadily. Ironically, there was a steady accumulation in the stock of food grains during the period. This is due to the fact that the government could easily raise its stock of food, but for the higher issue price the poor people cant purchase them. Therefore it does essentially mean an increase in the inventories which could not be utilized owing to the underconsumption of the poor, since food in ration shops is too high for them. It is revealed from the Economic Survey, between 1990 - 1995 the prices of food grain increased by 90 per cent, the prices of primary food article rose by 77 per cent and prices of manufactured product rose by 62 per cent. At the same time the purchasing power of the people measured in terms of per capita national income and per capita final consumer expenditure in the domestic market experienced a stagnation or decline even as an arithmetic average. The only outcome is that the poverty registers an increase. |
Search Site
Ganashakti Newsmagazine
74A Acharya Jagadish
Chandra Bose Road
Kolkata,India 700016
email: mail@ganashakti.co.in
Tel: 91-33-2227-8950 Fax: 91-33-2227-6263/8090
©Ganashakti,
Reproduction in any form without permission prohibited
![]()
Home Week Archive Portal
Feedback
Content Editorial Headline World Nation Bengal Column Feature
Contact Us
Site Designed and Hosted by Arijit Upadhyay